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Abstract
The paper provides an extremly simple model of the interaction of in-
ternational and internal conflicts. However, unlike the dominant approach
in the literature, which looks at these two types of conflicts as substitutes
in terms of investments of agents, this paper analyzes the situation when
these investments are complementary. In this case the existence of inter-
nal conflict may in fact trigger international war. The discussion is then
placed in the context of the democratic peace theory.
1 Introduction
”We need a small, victorious war to avert a revolution” is a phrase often at-
tributed to Vyacheslav Plehve, minister of interior of the Russian Empire at the
edge of the 20th century and one of the strongest proponents of the military en-
gagement against Japan (which turned out to be a disaster for Russia in 1905).
However, the idea of a ”small victorious war” seems to be present in many non-
democratic political systems, when the autocrats use military conflicts (even
against superior enemy) as an instrument to ensure the survival of the govern-
ment. The Falklands War, initiated by the military junta in Argentina, or the
attack of Iraq on Kuwait are just some recent examples. Ironically, many auto-
crats overestimated the power of their military, and the resulting defeat actually
triggered regime changes. However, the basic idea underlying the logic of the
small victorious war is that the desire to engage in military conflicts abroad may
depend upon the internal regime stability. This paper aims to explore the issue
in greater detail.
The existence of an interaction between political regimes and international con-
flicts seems to be obvious. The literature on ”democratic peace” claims that
the cooperation of states operating in an international anarchic environment is
more likely to be an outcome if both parties are democratic. Originally the
concept of democratic peace comes from political philosophy, but in the 1970s
it was translated in empirical political science and seems to be (at least, partly)
a confirmed empirical regularity. The theoretical literature on democratic peace
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is, however, relatively small, and there still seems to be place for research. In
what follows I first present the existing empirical evidence on the issue of demo-
cratic peace and survey the existing models, dealing with this issue. Then I
proceed by developing an extremely simple model, extending the democratic
peace problem by the considerations of ”small victorious war” logic.
2 Democratic peace and internal conflict
2.1 Empirical regularities
There are three main versions of the democratic peace theory, which have been
tested empirically. The most popular claim is that of the dyadic democratic
peace: pairs of democracies are less likely to engage in wars than pairs, where
at least one country is non-democratic. This claim is different from the nation-
level democratic peace, which assumes, that democracies are generally less likely
to engage in wars (or at least initiate wars), and has found no support in the
data. The third version of the approach, the systemic democratic peace, im-
plies that ”international systems” (or groups of interconnected countries) with
predominance of democracies should be more peaceful than international sys-
tems, where democracies form a minority. The systemic democratic peace has
been less thoroughly studied in empirical research, also because it obviously
depends upon the national-level and dyadic democratic peace (Gleditsch and
Hegre, 1997, McLaughlin Mitchell et al., 1999). However, at least in the 20th
century most military conflicts have been to a certain extend associated with
the interaction of many countries rather than with dealings within one partic-
ular dyad (which ends up fighting the real war). Nevertheless, so far the only
regularity robustly established seems to be the dyadic democratic peace.
There are several major criticisms regarding democratic peace empirics. First,
at least in the 20th century (when the number of democracies increased substan-
tially) most democratic polities happened to be allies in international conflicts
(from World War I to the Cold War), and common interests may explain the
persistence of peace rather than the political systems (Farber and Gowa, 1997).
Second, since democracy is a continuous rather than a binary variable, it is of
course very difficult to clearly identify where exactly in the range from ”au-
tocracy” to ”democracy” democratic peace should ”start” (Ray, 1998). Third,
democracies often engaged in colonial wars or military disputes over oversees
possessions (Ravlo et al., 2003). Finally, there is a usual problem of endogene-
ity, since the democratization may happen to be an outcome rather than a cause
of peace (Crescenzi and Enterline, 1999; Kadera et al., 2003).
The democratic peace theory is often associated with a number of further claims,
which, however, provide different results in empirical tests. Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (1999) list seven main hypotheses: (1) democracies can engage in wars
with non-democracies, (2) democracies tend to win a disproportionately high
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share of wars, (3) in international disputes democracies are more likely to find
peaceful settlement, (4) democracies are more likely to attack non-democracies,
than vice versa, (5) democracies suffer under lower costs if wars happen, (6) sta-
bility of democracies reduces the desire to fight and (7) size of democracies makes
them more likely to avoid wars. An interesting question, moreover, is whether
there is a significant difference between pairs where one country is democratic
and pairs of autocracies. The original idea of the democratic peace implied that
there should be more war between autocracies than between mixed pairs, and
there should be more war between mixed pairs than between democracies. An
alternative, however, is the hypothesis of the ”autocratic peace” (Peceny et al.,
2002), which claims that pairs of autocracies (or, at least, pairs of ”similar”
autocracies in terms of their political organization) are also less likely to fight
than pairs with different regimes.
2.2 Theoretical explanations: preferences and institutions
While the democratic peace seems to be a well-established empirical regularity
(of course, with all usual caveats), theoretical analysis of this phenomenon has
been limited so far. Basically, the literature has explored two lines of analy-
sis. The normative approach is to a certain extend a direct heir of the political
philosophy arguments in favor of democratic peace: it claims that democracies
share a specific ”political culture”, predisposing them to prefer peaceful solu-
tion to any confrontation. The argument is problematic because of two aspects.
First, and foremost, it explains an observed phenomenon (”democratic peace”)
with a unobservable characteristic (”political culture”) and therefore cannot be
falsified. One can explain any behavior with intrinsic preferences (since pref-
erences per definition are unobservable - only choices are); and the normative
approach just claims that democracies ”prefer” peace to war.1 If one, however,
defines a democracy as a number of procedures rather than ”shared values” (and
thus makes it better measurable empirically), than, second, there is no reason
to claim that democracy is associated with selection of individuals preferring
peace to war as the decision-makers. In fact, one can actually even show that in
many cases the democratization triggered the choice of violent solutions (Mann,
2004). The public opinion can actually support military confrontation (the best
example being the early period of World War I). Hence, it is reasonable to look
for explanations for democratic peace dealing with institutions rather than pref-
erences.
The first institutional explanation proposed in the literature deals with the
potential communication problems between democracies and non-democracies.
The initial approach to this problem was introduced by Fearon (1994), who
explained the democratic peace phenomenon with the size of audience costs in
democracies and non-democracies, modeling an international conflict as war of
1There are several attempts to measure democratic norms and to use them as predictors
for peace; for example, Zeev and Russett (1993) use stability and absence of internal conflicts
as proxies, but the validity of these variables is questionable.
3
attrition. His proceeds as follows: there is strong incentive for leaders to find a
settlement rather than to go to war. However, leaders of potential conflicting
parties also have an incentive to misrepresent their willingness to fight to the
opponent strategically, so that they can obtain higher benefits from bargaining.
If an international crisis occurs, the leaders signal to each other as to ”how
far” they are willing to go in order to achieve their goals. If a leader cheats
by choosing a signal different from her preferences, she is to suffer the audience
costs from the concerned domestic population, which was also able to observe
the signal; hence, the signal is costly and therefore commitment is possible. The
difference between democracies and non-democracies is that the first face higher
audience costs, and that is why the credibility of their signal is higher - hence,
dyads of democracies can resolve the disagreement without a war rather than
dyads where at least one partner is a non-democracy.
In the world of Fearon autocracies should experience more military crisis, than
democracies. However, both sides are equally likely to actually engage in war,
assuming there is no unintended military confrontation: while democracies pre-
fer to resolve their conflicts in private, autocracies are likely to initiate a public
dispute, but then to back down. This is still not sufficient to support the demo-
cratic peace argument, assuming that the leaders have at least a reasonable
control over their armies. Moreover, the model incorporates just one crisis and
does not allow the agents to learn from the past (i.e. update the prior distri-
bution of opponent’s costs of war). One could expect this repeated interaction
to be able to reduce the number of crises even if the audience costs are low. Of
course, in the real world one often observes countries ”increasing the stakes”
and trying to show the opponent that they are ”serious” this time. A good
example is North Korea: while until certain moment a mere threat of new nu-
clear experiments was sufficient, later it became necessary to actually launch
the missiles.2 However, in order to get this result one has to assume virtually
flat audience costs for non-democracy (probably, they are flat in North Korea)
- the government can escalate the crisis as long as it wants and is always able to
quit. Finally, audience costs (or accountability of the leader) are only one side
of the democratic polities; the other side is the flexibility of decision-making:
if the internal decision-making mechanism is too complex, democracies, though
able to provide credible commitment, will fail to provide any commitment at all
(cf. Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999).
Levy and Razin (2004) add yet another aspect of communication problems able
to generate the democratic peace result. In their model two countries can go to
war or make concessions; concessions of both sides are strategic complements.
In each country there is a leader, who is fully informed about the benefit of
concessions for her own side, and the general population, which is uninformed.
Neither the leader nor the public have full information about the opponent. In a
2Here I compare not the duration of crises, like Fearon, but their intensity, what is obviously
equivalent from the point of view of his argument.
4
democracy the decision is made by the uninformed public (so that the ”leader”
is actually rather a consultant); in an autocracy it is the leader who decides.
Then there are two channels to enforce the democratic peace. First, the unin-
formed public in a democracy is more likely to make concessions, than the fully
informed leader, who could find, that the concessions are not sufficient. Sec-
ond, there is a problem similar to the audience costs: while the non-democratic
leaders can always cheat, the democratic leaders want to influence both foreign
leader and their own public to make the ”right” choice and hence cannot cheat.
There are two problems related to the approach. First, it describes the au-
tocrat as a completely unconstrained ruler; she can actually do whatever she
wants without getting any disagreement from the public. This claim is hardly
correct: autocrats have more degrees of freedom in making foreign policy deci-
sions, but they still have to think about reaction at home. This feature, however,
could probably just make the results less pronounced; what is much more im-
portant (and much more problematic) is, second, that the paper assumes that
the decision-makers in a democracy are less informed than in an autocracy. It
is difficult to accept this claim; on the contrary, in a non-democracy leaders are
often likely to be less informed because of bad quality of bureaucratic machine.
Egorov and Sonin (2006) show that in a non-democracy leader is likely to se-
lect ”bad” bureaucrats as a precaution against a coup. And there are many
”leaders” (as Levy and Razin call them) in a democracy, often providing much
better information to the public. From this perspective the situation should be
actually reverse to that described in the paper.
The second explanation able to influence the democratic peace result may be
that the autocrats benefit differently from peacetime production and from the
fruits of war. Jackson and Morelli (2007) provide a model similar to this logic,
assuming that the probability of war depends upon the cost-benefit analysis of
military conflict implemented by the crucial decision-maker: the median voter
in a democracy and the dictator in an autocracy. The model assumes that in
a world of two countries the probability of winning depends upon the relative
wealth levels: rich country is more likely to win. The pivotal agent controls a
fraction of the initial wealth and a fraction of the revenue from military con-
frontation. If the ratio of these two values is different from unity, there is a
political bias. Furthermore, the model allows the transfers between countries.
It shows first that if both countries are unbiased, there is always a settlement
possible (”unbiased peace”). It is claimed that in many democracies we observe
in real world political bias is smaller than in autocracies, and it explains the
existence of the democratic peace result. However, the model does not claim
that all democracies are unbiased: hence, the ”democratic peace” is to a cer-
tain extend an outcome of misinterpretation of two concepts. The model is then
generalized to a multiple-countries case and to the case of endogenous bias. The
most interesting conclusion is that an unbiased pivotal voter may select a biased
leader to make his decisions if international transfers are allowed, because it can
be used to extract transfers from other countries. This result is to a certain ex-
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tend standard in the considerations like that: in a similar way voters may prefer
to select extreme opponents of centralization when bargaining over allocation
of powers in a federation (Lorz and Willman, 2005), and, to a certain extend,
to the original ideas of Schelling’s bargaining research.
The third approach supporting the democratic peace empirics through insti-
tutions assumes that the main difference between democracies and autocracies
is that in the former leaders can be punished by the public. Since war is costly
for the population to a greater extend than for the leaders, the latter are likely to
prefer military solutions while being unconstrained by punishment of the public.
In the model of Tangeras (2008) two leaders simultaneously choose whether to
engage in a military conflict, while the military capability is randomly assigned
by the nature. The winning side receives a transfer from the opponent. There
is also an exogenous cost of war, which is covered by the population, but not
by the ruler. Hence, the rulers will wage the war too often. The population can
(conditional on the military success or failure) replace the ruler. The re-elections
are costless for the selectorate in a democracy and costly in an autocracy. The
selectorate announces the re-selection probabilities for the ruler in case there is
a victorious war, the war is lost or there is no war. Unfortunately, there is no
commitment device for the selectorate, which has therefore to choose the time-
consistent re-selection probabilities (i.e. probabilities which are post-conflict
rational). The paper claims that in an autocracy the only time-consistent pol-
icy of the public is to reselect the ruler independently of the past behavior,
while in a democracy the reselection policy can be conditional on the behavior
of the ruler. Therefore a democratic ruler expects to be punished for his ma-
licious behavior and does not wage wars too often. A certain limitation of the
approach is that it offers a specific view on the conflict: the military capacities
are exogenous, and the government cannot undertake any measures to restraint
people from removing it from office.
Debs and Goemans (2008) describe a similar game where re-election takes place
after the war happens; however, they do not look on time-consistency, but point
out the difference between the regimes in terms of effect of war on costs of re-
placing the leader. They claim that in a democracy costs of replacing the leader
depend on military success to a smaller extend, than in an autocracy (to replace
a defeated leader is much cheaper, than to replace a victorious one); combined
with lower punishment for being replaced for the leader, it generates the demo-
cratic peace result. The paper also tries to support the basic claim of relation
between military success and leader’s destiny empirically.
Bueno de Mesquita et al.(1999) endogenize the spending for military purposes;
however, their main idea is that military spending is in a certain sense substitute
for expenditures for internal support. The difference between the dictatorship
and the democracy is that the former has to ensure support of a smaller group,
than the latter. The game is the following: first both sides decide on military
spending and the conflict takes place; then after the conflict the leaders face
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re-election by the selectorate. There is uncertainty about the challengers. The
decision of the selectorate’s members depends upon the leader’s chosen allo-
cation between public goods (i.e. war effort) and private goods (transfers to
members of selectorate) and the resulting revenue per capita (with democracy
requiring larger winning coalition than the autocracy). Because of large win-
ning coalition, democratic leader can hardly gain through providing transfers
(per capita transfer is too small). Therefore the only way to ensure necessary
support is to make careful decisions with respect to the public goods (and war
effort). Hence, democracies (i) are less likely to engage in wars with low proba-
bility of success and (ii) once deciding to engage in war, spend more on winning
the confrontation. The problem of this approach is that even in an autocracy it
is unreasonable to ignore population outside the winning coalition (since there is
always a threat of revolution). Moreover, the assumption that military spending
and loyalty spending are strict substitutes may be questioned, as I will try to
show in the next section.
2.3 Domestic and international conflict
The last line of argumentation may relate the international conflict to the out-
comes of internal political struggle and competition. Garfinkel (1994) looks at
the military spending in the presence of competition between political parties,
each representing a particular group of heterogeneous population. The main
claim is that electoral uncertainty reduces the size of military spending of a
country (for a given level of military spending of its opponents) and, in turn,
causes a reduction of military spending in other countries. In this world mili-
tary spending of democracies is smaller, than of non-democracies (what is also
empirically shown in the paper of Garfinkel, as well as by Kimenyi and Mbaku,
1995 and Fordham and Walker, 2005), and political competition reduces the
intensity of the conflict. As a result, political competition improves welfare in a
world where international conflict is possible. The perception of conflicts within
and between groups as, to a certain extend, substitutes, is present in several
papers (Garfinkel, 2004; Muenster and Staal, 2007; Muenster, 2007), but with
certain exceptions: for example, Garfinkel (2004) shows that the conflict within
group diminishes in presence of external threat only if the marginal return from
guarding the contested prize from external invader is small enough. The often
observed increase in the ”sense of unity” of nations in case of war against a
common enemy certainly supports this perception of conflicts.
However, electoral competition is only one form of internal conflicts, which may
be relevant for the democratic peace. Non-democracies are of course not free
from conflicts, although they never take form of peaceful political competition:
however, revolutions, rebellions and coups are typical for most non-democratic
countries. One of the characteristic features of non-democracies is that the mili-
tary is actively involved in internal politics. Basically, this involvement can take
several forms, which also lead to different effects of military expenditures on the
survival of autocrats. On the one hand, investments in military are likely to
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strengthen the political power of the dictators by, first, reducing the threat of a
coup (which can be initiated by the army)3, and second, by using armed forces
against the national population in case of a rebellion - a common practice for
virtually all non-democracies (even regimes with very strong internal political
police were forced to rely on military in case of major political turbulences,
like Soviet Union for the Novocherkassk strike in the 1960s). It may also ex-
plain higher military expenditures of autocracies: investments in arms are just
a by-product of the desire of the autocrat to preserve the internal power. These
investments, however, can effectively lead to war; sustaining large army as a
combat-ready force without wars is often difficult. The idea of ”small victorious
war” is a specific modification of this line of argumentation. Plehve probably
assumed, that people get some utility just from the fact that they were ”on
the winning side”, regardless of any real transfers, and thus will support the
victorious government. But it can be also re-interpreted in the following way:
in a small victorious war military success outside the country effectively reduces
the probability of revolution inside, so, military expenditures are once again a
source to strengthen the power of the dictator (though indirectly).
Certainly, on the other hand, investing in arms often means investing in po-
tential political opponents. As Finer (2002: 5) puts it, ”instead of asking why
the military engages in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do other-
wise”. From this point of view investing in military constitutes a threat for the
autocrat - in fact, the coup can turn out to be ”the only successful operation
of the army”, as the president of Bolivia Daniel Salamanca supposedly said to
the generals, who removed him from office after the long and completely unsuc-
cessful Chaco War in the first half of the 20th century. Hence, there may be
a trade-off between success in external conflict and internal political security.
The model I present in the next section, however, ignores these considerations;
so, one can claim, that the paper is more appropriate to study the military
dictatorships, where military coups are obviously not the issue.
To conclude, the role of military as a power in internal conflicts in non-democracies
may influence the military investments and, as a consequence, the likelihood of
international conflicts. The aim of this paper is exactly to develop a very simple
model accounting for this fact.
3Of course, one could simply bribe the generals rather than invest in army; however,
forward-looking military leaders will always insist on increasing investments in the military
to develop their own power base
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3 Model and results
3.1 Basic model
Assume that the world consists of two countries A and B, fighting for a given
resource V. The probability of country B to gain control over resources is
pw =
mb
ma +mb
(1)
if the investments of at least one party in the conflict are non-zero and .5 oth-
erwise. The war happens if both parties invest a non-zero effort in warfare, if
only one party makes military investments and the other does not, it is assumed
that the second party surrenders. mi for i = A,B denotes the investments in
warfare. Both countries are endowed with identical resources R. The resources
spent for the war could be alternatively used for productive activity, and both
countries have linear production functions; so, each unit of resource R invested
in productive activity yields βa units of output in country A and respectively βb
units in country B (this is actually the main driving force for obtaining peaceful
equilibria in the model; for a more general framework see Bennour, 2008). In
the first stage let us ignore the internal conflict in countries A and B and focus
exclusivly on the international warfare. The payoffs of both conflict parties are
denoted by
pia = (1− pw)V + βa(R−ma) (2)
and
pib = pwV + βb(R−mb) (3)
Since the first order condition for the country B is
∂pib
∂mb
=
maV
(mb +ma)2
− βb = 0 (4)
one can immediately find that the country B sets its investments in warfare
equal to
mb =
√
V
βb
ma −ma (5)
if ma < Vβb and zero otherwise. The derivative of the payoff of country A given
the reaction of country B is
∂pia
∂ma
=
1
2
√
βbV
ma
− βa (6)
Evaluating the derivative at ma = Vβb one can see that it is non-negative if and
only if βaβb ≤ 12 . Hence, if this condition holds, the country A in equilibrium
chooses the level of military expenditures such that the country B invests zero
in warfare and ”surrenders”. Symmetrically, if βaβb ≥ 2, country B in equilibrium
chooses the level of military spending ensuring the surrender of country A. The
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conflict therefore takes place if βaβb ∈ (.5, 2). One should bear in mind that the
level of mi = Vβj , i 6= j may exceed countries resources. It is true, for instance,
if Vβi > R. If this inequality holds for i = a, the lower bound of the ”peaceful
interval” disappears, since A can never invest sufficient amount of resources to
ensure surrender of B. Obviously, for i = b the opposite holds. To summarize,
one can state that
Observation 1: The war takes place if and only if at least one of the following
cases holds: (a) βaβb ∈ (.5, 2), (b)
βa
βb
≤ .5 and Vβb ≥ R and (c)
βa
βb
≥ 2 and Vβa ≥ R
Hence the probability of war is increasing if countries are sufficiently poor (as
opposed to the size of V ) and just cannot afford investing too much in prevent-
ing military confrontation or if countries are rich enough, but relatively similar
to each other in terms of relative productivity of alternative use of resources
averted from military spending to peaceful production. This is not surprising:
the claim of Hirshleifer (1989) that the conflict is unavoidable in a ratio success
function is made exactly for the case when βa = βb = 1. I will assume for the
time being that both opponents are able to invest sufficiently large and restrict
attention to case (a) of Observation 1.
3.2 Dictator as aggressor
The next step is to adjust the analysis in order to understand the differences
between dictatorships and democracies. Assume that the specific feature of dic-
tatorship is that the dictator takes away an exogenous share of rents d produced
in the country. The population keeps the rest of the rents. Analogously, the
dictator in country B receives a share dw of the revenue from war against A
(and the ratio d
w
d is the political bias as in Jackson and Morelli, 2007). Obvi-
ously, the public dislikes the oppression by the dictator and is willing to rebel.
The rebellion is modeled as an additional (internal) conflict: so, there are two
sequential conflicts: an external (war) and an internal (rebellion). The rebellion
is also described with a ratio contest success function, where both dictator and
public invest fraction of their revenue in weapons.4 The timing of events is the
following: first the countries engage in war. After the war, the revolution takes
place in both countries. In a democracy d = dw = 0, and hence, the public
always spends zero on the rebellion (because there is nothing to gain). I ignore
the collective action problem for the revolution: there is no ”opting out” for
individuals not participating in the revolt. Moreover, while in the first stage
the question is how to distribute the resources between military capacity and
production, in the second stage production has already been implemented; the
sides just struggle for the division of the pie.
4Although for simplicity I refer to weapons, the means of internal conflict may as well
be propaganda or repressions; important is that the dictator has to spend some part of his
revenue to prevent a revolution.
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In the first step I assume that the dictatorship exists in country B; country
A is a democracy. Denoting the spending for means of internal conflict in coun-
try i as ap and ad for the public and for the dictator respectively, one can write
the respective payoffs of the public and of the dictator as follows:
pip = (1− d)βb(R−mb) + (1− dw)V pw + pr(dβb(R−mb) + dwV pw)− ap (7)
pid = (1− pr)(dβb(R−mb) + dwV pw)− ad (8)
If both dictator and public invest zero effort in conflict the dictator keeps the
share of the national revenue with certainty. For the payoff of the population
the first two terms is the share of the revenue from productive activity and war
the public receives in case the dictatorship remains in power. The third term
is the gain from revolution, which expropriates the revenue of the dictator if
successful (with pr being the probability of successful rebellion). The first term
in the payoff of the dictator is her revenue if the revolution is unsuccessful; in
case the rebellion is able to overthrow the current regime, the revenue of the
dictator is assumed to be zero. The key assumption of the model is the definition
of pr. Probability of success for the revolution is given by
pr =
ap
ap + adθ(mb)
(9)
where θ(mb) is assumed to be a continuous, monotonous and (for technical con-
venience) twice differentiable and concave function, mapping mb on <0+. This
term represents the complementarity between spending on international and on
domestic conflict. By investing in the first conflict the dictator changes the prob-
ability of the success in the internal conflict. If θ′(mb) < 0, the investments in
army actually reduce the probability of success in internal conflict: for example,
army may become an alternative power center potentially dangerous for dictator
(since it may stage a coup). If θ′(mb) > 0, military spending for external secu-
rity increases the probability of success in internal conflict. Finally, θ′(mb) = 0
means that there is no effect of external army on internal security; this case
is uninteresting and therefore left aside. Moreover, I assume θ(0) ∈ [0; 1]. If
θ(0) = 0, it means, that without military support internal police is unable to
operate. By restricting the upper bound of θ(0) to unity I restrict my attention
to the cases, when, given zero investments in external army, the efficiency of
dictator’s investments into internal security is exactly identical to that of the
opposition. The literature often assumes that the incumbent has an advantage
in the internal conflict (e.g. Rocco and Ballo, 2008), but in this paper I ignore
this aspect to make the argument clearer and to understand which effects are
actually at work. Obviously, if θ(.) is a decreasing function, the case θ(0) = 0
is not compatible with the assumption that θ(.) has a non-negative co-domain.
Therefore I also drop this case.
Internal conflict: Solving the model by backward induction implies that one
has to start with the internal conflict. The first-order condition for the popula-
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tion is given by:
∂pip
∂ap
= −1 + adθ(mb)
(ap + adθ(mb))2
(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV ) = 0 (10)
which yields the reaction curve of
ap =
√
adθ(mb)(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV )− adθ(mb) (11)
if adθ(mb) < dβb(R − mb) + dwpwV and zero otherwise. Now the dictator’s
problem for non-zero ap gives
∂pid
∂ad
= −1 + 1
2
√
dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV
ad
θ(mb) = 0 (12)
and therefore the optimal choice of the dictator is
ad =
dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV
4
θ(mb) (13)
The dictator investments are large enough to prohibit a revolution if θ(mb) ≥ 2,
i.e. the positive effect from spending on army for internal security is large enough
(recall, however, that mb is a choice variable which is set in the first stage of
the game). Otherwise the revolution takes place. On the other hand, by similar
calculations one shows that the condition for the dictator to spend zero on
internal security is ap ≥ dβb(R − mb) + dwpwV ; however, the public always
chooses ap smaller than the prize to win, and hence, the dictator always makes
some investments in internal security. To conclude, the revenue of dictator for
given level of mb is
pid =
θ(mb)
4
(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV ) (14)
if θ(mb) < 2 and
pid =
θ(mb)− 1
θ(mb)
(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV ) (15)
otherwise. The rest is spent for internal conflict.
Military expenditure of country B: From the results of internal conflict, the
reaction curve of mb for given ma is thus described by the following equations
θ′(mb)
4
(dβb(R−mb) + dwpwV ) + θ(mb)4 (−dβb + d
wV
ma
(ma +mb)2
) = 0 (16)
if θ(mb) < 2 and
θ′(mb)
θ2(mb)
(dβb(R−mb)+dwpwV )+ θ(mb)− 1
θ(mb)
(−dβb+dwV ma(ma +mb)2 ) = 0 (17)
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otherwise. Unfortunately, there is no reason to assume that the equilibrium is
unique: both equations can have multiple solutions, meeting the constraints.
It is also possible that the equations have no solutions; in this case the equi-
librium expenditures are either strictly zero or R (depending upon the sign of
the left-hand side expression). However, one can still make several conclusions
about the spending on military purposes of the country B even for the general
assumptions. I just assume that in case there are no solutions to the equations
satisfying the constraint on (mb), the optimal choice is R and not 0.
First of all, there are two effects influencing the conflict behavior. First, there is
a political bias effect. Assume pr = 0. The dictator cares only for a fraction of
national revenue, which is attributed to her own budget; from the point of view
of dictator the nation is just less productive, because from each unit of internal
output a portion is ”wasted” as revenue of the population. If the dictator gets
a higher share of her domestic revenue, the difference between the ”real coun-
try” and the ”part of the country generating utility for the dictator” becomes
smaller, and the decision of dictator is closer to that of a democratic leader (in
fact, the idea is from a certain point of view similar to the McGuire-Olson type
of models: the desire of dictator to engage in wasteful policies is smaller since
the size of the pie also goes down). Similarly, she cares only about a fraction
of revenue from conflict: if dw decreases, the dictator gets a smaller share of
the rent V which is contested, and does not care to attack any more. In par-
ticular, if dw = 0, the dictator never attacks (even if it could generate rents
for the whole country). The effect of political bias depends upon the relation
between the ratio of peaceful productivities and the ratio of dictator’s revenue
from external and internal conflict (see Figure 1). Assume that originally war
was possible only in the dotted interval (remember, that we disregard the prob-
lem of potentially lacking resources for the dictator). Now if one considers the
pure political bias effect in one country, the conflict zone moves to the shaded
area: on the one hand, there is no war for small dw/d ratios (since the dictator
looses too much and earns too little), and there is war when the ratio is large,
even if no conflict was chosen under democracy.
If the rebels can win in the internal conflict with a positive probability, there
is also a second effect of dictatorship on conflict. First assume θ′(mb) > 0,
i.e. armed forces support the police in restoring internal peace. In this case,
intuitively, the dictator is likely to invest more in external conflict, than a demo-
cratic government; even if external conflict is not attractive per se, the dictator
is still interested in providing army for internal purposes. Evaluate the reaction
curve at mb = 0. Obviously, one has to look only at equation (16), since equa-
tion (17) assumes θ(0) > 2, what is excluded by assumption. In this case the
condition for optimal mb to be larger than zero is
θ′(0)dβbR+ θ(0)(
dwV
ma
− dβb) > 0 (18)
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Figure 1: Peaceful settlement and war equilibria if B is non-democratic and A
is democratic: political bias effect
for any ma. One can obviously notice that
Observation 2: If θ(0) = 0, the zero level of mb is never optimal.
So, if internal police cannot operate without support from external military
forces, country B will always make investments in military force. If θ(0) > 0,
it is well possible that for ma large enough the dictator chooses zero military
effort. In this case the result depends upon both political bias and complemen-
tarity effects. Consider the left-hand side of (18). The first term is positive;
the sign of the second term may be positive or negative, but it is smaller for
larger ma (and has the smallest value for ma = R). The sign of the second
term depends upon the degree of political bias . If political bias (d
w
d ) is larger
than RβbV , the second term is always positive and zero military expenditures are
never optimal, regardless of the investments of the country A in military forces
(recall, that ma ≤ R per definition). Moreover, for ma = Vβb (the minimal value
of military expenditures of country A necessary to ensure surrender of country
B if the latter were democratic), zero investments are possible only if political
bias is sufficiently small given the θ(.) function. Since Vβb < R by assumption,
this condition requires lower levels of political bias than the previous one. To
conclude:
Observation 3: If θ(0) > 0 there exists political bias b∗ such that for d
w
d > b
∗
the zero level of mb is never optimal and there exists political bias b∗∗ < b∗ such
that d
w
d > b
∗∗ the expenditures of country A to ensure unilateral surrender of
country B should be larger, than in case of two democracies, and hence, the
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lower bound of the βaβb combinations where war takes place shifts downwards.
In particular, for b∗ > RβbV the zero level is never optimal and b
∗∗ > 1V 2 the
expenditures to ensure surrender exceed those of a democracy regardless of θ(.).
From the point of view of complementarity between internal and external secu-
rity, I consider is the log derivative of the θ evaluated at 0. For a given level of
political bias, there exist θˆ(.) function such that the logarithmic derivative of
the function at 0 is large enough
θˆ′(0)
θˆ(0)
>
1
R
− V
βbRma
dw
d
, (19)
for which zero level expenditures on mb are never optimal. Obviously, the log
derivative at zero satisfying the expression above may be smaller if the political
bias is larger. If log derivative is larger than 1R , the military expenditures are
non-zero for any level of political bias. Similarly, there exists θ˜(.) such that the
expenditures of country A to ensure unilateral surrender of country B should
be larger, than in case of two democracies. To conclude, there are two forces
driving the military expenditures - high political bias and low effectiveness of
internal police without military support. If the political bias is very high or
internal police is very bad, the military investments are non-zero anyway, re-
gardless of the other factor; otherwise the war is generated by the interaction
of these two factors (sufficiently high log derivative or sufficiently high political
bias).
Consider the case of θ′(mb) < 0. In this case the dictator faces a problem:
investing in military capacities she makes her demise through an internal revo-
lution more likely. There is hence a trade-off between chances to get the prize
in external war and the probability to lose power - a problem often faced by
dictators with strong military forces. The main difference in the analysis is that
in expression (18) the first term is now negative. Since in this case one has
to consider θ(0) > 0, the political bias comes into play: if the political bias is
large enough, the second term is positive and exceeds the first term, so that the
non-zero military investments are optimal. As in observation 3, there exist b∗
and b∗∗ ensuring that autocracy is more belligerent than the democracy; how-
ever, the respective values are obviously larger, than in case of θ(.) increasing
function. It reflects the ”greed” of the dictator: if the political bias effect is very
large, the dictator becomes too greedy and is ready to risk an international war
and to build up her military even knowing that it will cause trouble in inter-
nal conflict (where large military actually reduces her ability to fight the rebels).
As a final note, one should notice, that both the political bias and the com-
plementarity of military expenditures and the internal police make the conflict
expenditures inefficient in a sense that they reduces the total post-conflict rev-
enue of the country B. Hence, the countries might engage a war which actually
reduces the overall size of the pie available for the redistribution, but also with-
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draw from war which may increase their revenue.
External conflict: Larger military expenditures of country B do not auto-
matically imply, however, that there is going to be war according to our defini-
tion. The optimal level of military expenditures may exceed Vβa , thus making
country A surrender. Recalculating (14) and (15) for ma =
√
Vmb
βb
−mb and
taking derivative with respect to mb, one can immediately see that the condi-
tion for investments exceeding the threshold depends on the political bias and
shape of θ(.). In order to analyze equilibria, one has to introduce restrictions on
the θ(.) to obtain more structure. Consider one extremely simple case, where
θ(mb) = cmb, c 6= 0 can be treated as a measure of complementarity between
external and internal security.5 In this case, obviously, zero investments are
never en equilibrium. For cmb < 2 the choice of mb is independent of c; for
cmb ≥ 2 it is decreasing in c. The intuition is that for the second range of
values the investments in internal conflict are actually fixed (at the minimal
level ensuring absence of a revolution), which is decreasing in c. Hence, if c
increases, it is possible to invest less in external security, still ensuring internal
peace. However, for larger c it is more likely that the root of (16) is indeed
the equilibrium, satisfying the constraint on c,mb. The main result is that in
this interpretation c high enough does not necessarily allow country B to invest
sufficiently much to make country A surrender. The situation is different with
the political bias. In fact,
Observation 4: If θ(mb) = cmb, the optimal military expenditures are in-
creasing in political bias.
Proof: . From (14) using the implicit function theorem and the fact that
ma =
√
Vmb
βb
−mb, follows
∂mb
∂ d
w
d
= −
c
√
mbβbV + .5cmb
√
V βbm
−1
b
−cβb + c(−βb + .5dwd
√
V βbm
−1
b )− .5cm−.5b
√
V βb
dw
d
> 0 (20)
Hence, mb is increasing in political bias for mb ≤ 2c . Similarly, from (15) follows
∂mb
∂ d
w
d
= −
1
cm2
b
√
mbβbV + .5(1 − 1cmb
)
√
V βb
mb
− 2
cm3
b
(βb(R −mb) + d
w
d
√
mbV βb) + +
2
cm2
b
(−βb + .5 d
w
d
√
V βbm
−1
b
) + .5(1 − 1
cmb
)( d
w
d
√
V βbm
−1.5
b
)
> 0
(21)
5This setting has several advantages. The expressions (16) and (17) turn into polynomials
for
√
mb. Moreover, we know more about the existence of equilibria. Equation (16) is a
quadratic equation in terms of
√
mb; it is therefore a parabola which opens downward, however,
has at least one positive value (at mb = 0). Hence, roots exist, and one root is positive.
Equation (17) turns into a third-order equation, which always have roots. It is, of course,
possible, that the roots are outside of the area specified by the restriction on cmb; if it is true
for both equations, it implies, that the left-hand side expressions in (16) and (17) are strictly
positive and the optimal mb is R.
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and mb is increasing in political bias for mb > 2c .
Hence, one can conclude, that for this special form of θ(.) the investments
sufficient to ensure the surrender of A are more likely to be achieved for higher
political bias (what is not the case in general). Hence, war actually happens if
the dictatorship has an intermediate level of political bias.
Two dictators: So far I have focused on country A and assumed country
B is a democracy. Now let us turn to a more general setting, where country A
is dictatorship as well (with probabily different political bias), and θa(.), θb(.)
describe the complementarity between internal and external investments in both
countries. The main observation is very simple, however, fits exacly the predic-
tions of the democratic peace theory
Observation 5: For two dictatorships when θa(0) = θb(0) = 0 there is al-
ways war regardless of all other parameters.
Thus if the internal police cannot operate without military support (or mili-
tary support is necessary to maintain the power of the dictator for any other
reason), there is always war. This is the first result where war is unavoidable;
both sides never surrender, which is also consistent with the democratic peace
theory.
3.3 Large vs. small war
The analysis of the paper so far was based on a simplified assumption, which is
usually made in the literature: if both sides invest in war, I assumed that there
actually is going to be a military conflict. The problem with this assumption in
the setting of this paper is that, if military expenditures are at least partly mo-
tivated by the internal considerations, it is hard to believe that the government
will automatically use the accumulated military potential for warfare. This is-
sue does not exist in our model by construction: assume that the government
makes two decisions: first, the size of expenditures on armed forces, and second,
whether it attacks or not. It is easy to see that if investments are positive,
the attack strictly dominates the decision to withdraw from conflict (since the
expenditures have already been made, and the only difference is whether there
is a chance to obtain the prize or not). Obviously in the reality the situation is
different: first, war always means additional expenditures (even if the army is
well trained and prepared to fight), and second, there is not only a prize to win,
but there may be transfers from the losing party to the winner. In this section I
will examine the second option, assuming that there are going to be transfers to
the winner if the war takes place. One can roughly make the distinction between
”small” and ”large” wars: a small local conflict usually does not imply signifi-
cant costs for the economy in general and also does not require countries to make
serious concessions - the conflict influences only the relatively small prize. How-
ever, in case of a large war the costs will be overwhelming for the whole country.
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In order to model a large war, assume that there is no prize V , but a transfer,
such that V can be obtained in case of victory, but has to be paid in case of
defeat. In this case the payoffs of two democracies can be written as
pia = (1− pw)V − pwV + βa(R−ma) (22)
pib = pwV − (1− pw)V + βb(R−mb) (23)
Obviously, for the case of democracy there is no need to make any distinction
between investing in military capabilities and actually starting a war (since there
is no internal conflict). The optimal choice of B is either
mb =
√
2V
βb
ma −ma (24)
for ma < 2V/βb or zero otherwise (since underinvesting is costly, the thresh-
old for peaceful settlement is higher). However, computing first derivative of
pia and evaluating it at the threshold ma still yields the same conditions as in
case without transfers for peaceful settlement. To conclude, peace is possible if
βa
βb
∈ (.5, 2) or the investments guaranteeing the surrender of the opponent are
unfeasible (what I will, as above, ignore for simplicity).
Now turn to the case when the country B is a dictatorship with θ′(mb) > 0.
However, introduce an additional choice variable: let the choice set of rivals in
the first-stage conflict be {A;S} ×mi, where A stands for ”attack” and S for
”surrender”. Let the share of dictator in both revenue from victory and loss
from defeat be identical (for simplicity). Moreover, assume that no war is pre-
ferred to a war with zero revenue; this assumption is reasonable if one thinks
of additional costs of the war which can occur. The war happens if at least
one country goes to war, and its opponent makes non-negative investments in
warfare (if the first condition holds, but the second does not, the opponent is
assumed to surrender as above).
First consider the case when country A never attacks, i.e. its military invest-
ment is purely defensive in the sense of Grossman and Kim (1995); however, if
the country B attacks and looses, it still has to pay the transfer. I assume that
the game has the following timing:
1. country B makes decision on mb;
2. country B announces its decision to attack (there is no commitment prob-
lem, both decisions on mb and {A;S} are perfectly observable);
3. country A makes decision on ma;6
6Obviously, it is a huge simplification, since it rules out an unexpected aggression and gives
the victim enough time to prepare for war. The problem is that in simultaneous-move games
modeling the international conflict there are often no equilibria.
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4. war takes place;
5. internal conflict in B takes place.
Moreover, it is assumed that if mb = 0, S is chosen automatically. The analysis
of the second-stage game is hardly different from what was discussed in the
previous section and yields
θ′(mb)
4
(dβb(R−mb)+dwmb −ma
mb +ma
VW )+
θ(mb)
4
(−dβb+dwVW 2ma(ma +mb)2 ) = 0
(25)
if θ(mb) < 2 and
θ′(mb)
θ2(mb)
(dβb(R−mb)+dwpwmb −ma
mb +ma
VW )+
θ(mb)− 1
θ(mb)
(−dβb+dwWV 2ma(ma +mb)2 ) = 0
(26)
otherwise. W is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if war takes place and
zero otherwise. Now consider the decision of A on ma. In case of war (W = 1)
it sets ma =
√
2V mbβ−1a −mb for mb < 2V/βa or zero otherwise. If there is
no war, ma = 0. Now turn to the decision on W . If ma ≥ mb, the expected
transfer from war is non-positive, and hence W = 0. If the last condition holds
if mb < V/2βa. Otherwise there is war. Now turn to the decision on mb. Once
again, focus on expression (25) (since (26) is irrelevant for the analysis of zero
investments) and just try to find out whether mb = 0 can be an equilibrium
if W = 0 (assuming, that the equilibrium exists; as stated above, the analysis
cannot be carried out without restricting θ(.)). If θ(0) = 0, mb = 0 is never
optimal since the left-hand side of (25) is positive.
Observation 6: If θ(0) = 0, the country B always makes positive invest-
ments in military capacity, but chooses W = 0, if the optimal mb < V/2βa.
Hence, a non-democratic country will make completely wasteful investments
in warfare, which just serve the purpose of supporting the power of the dicta-
tor, if the enemy’s military power is larger, than that of the dictator. The story
does not change if A is a dictatorship: in this case for increasing θa A just makes
larger investments in military capacity because of internal conflict.
However, the assumptions of the game so far implied a huge simplification:
A was per definition a victim, while B coud unilaterally decide on whether to
wage war or not. Assume now that A can also attack: for that add a new
step between steps 3 and 4 in the timing of the game: A chooses whether to
attack B or not (if B has not chosen war at stage 2). A is a democracy, B is
an autocracy with θ(0) = 0. The straightforward logic shows that in this case
there is always war, except for the case of surrender of one of the countries,
when the optimal response to opponent’s choice of mi is zero, and the balance-
of-power case ma = mb, when both countries invest exactly the same, and as
mentioned, the zero transfer is assumed to be inferior to no-war situation. If ma
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is much larger than mb, ma will attack, otherwise B attacks. Obviously, if mb
is large enough, A surrenders. However, if ma is large enough and the transfer
V is large, unlike the previous discussion, B can also surrender, although in this
case the dictator loses in the internal revolution. The reason is that in case of
surrender the revenue from internal revolution is just zero; however, if the war
takes place, it can be negative. Once again, this observation is not completely
weird, if one thinks of real-world experience: the dictators can just prefer to
surrender and escape from their country, rather than to fight a war (of course,
if one sets the payoff from defeat in the revolution to be −∞ (if the dictator is
caught and executed) at least with some positive probability, things do change).
Once again, if two autocracies face each other, story does not change, and even
in this case surrender can be preferred by one of the dictators.
4 Conclusion
Democratic peace may at least to a certain extend be outcome of internal po-
litical struggles in non-democracies. This paper examined the problem, looking
at two factors potentially influencing the military expenditures of the coun-
tries: degree of complementarity between external security and internal peace
and political bias of the dictator. First, it shows that in case of a conflict for
an exogenous prize, non-democracies with high complementarity and with high
political bias tend to overinvest in military effort, even if the expected payoff for
the entire nation is goes down. For a specific form of influence function of army
on the success of internal conflict the equilibrium military expenditures increase
in political bias; however, the parameters of the influence function have an am-
biguous effect on military spending. Of course, the investments may become
so high, that the opponent simply surrenders, and there is once again no war.
However, for two non-democracies and the special case when internal security
cannot be supported without military presence anyway, the war is inevitable
regardless of all other parameters of the model.
This result may at least partly explain why non-democracies so eagerly en-
gage in ”small (potentially) victorious wars”. One should notice that the wars
happen even if the non-democracy is well informed about the potential costs of
war, and are therefore not an outcome of misperception of enemy’s forces: for a
dictator it can be rational to engage in conflict actually decreasing the wealth
of the country. However, in case the country is facing a large-scale conflict (i.e.
conflict with transfers to the winner), the situation changes. The paper shows
that in this case positive military expenditures can be made even if there is
absolute security from external threat and the country itself does not attack
the opponent. The military budget is determined only by internal political con-
siderations. Hence, in ”large wars” situations non-democracies invest in army,
but do not attack, while in ”small wars” army actually engages the potential
enemy. Of course, in the real world the distinction between small and large wars
is questionable and may be difficult (especially if the third-party intervention is
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possible).
The model in fact generates the main prediction of the democratic peace empir-
ics: even if two democracies were (given the parameters) to choose a peaceful
settlement, turning at least one of them into an autocracy may generate an
equilibrium with war. With respect to further predictions, however, situation
is less favorable for my exercise. In the model it is the autocracy, and not the
democracy, which is more likely to over-invest in military capacity creating the
potential for war. One should be aware that the empirical claim discussed in
the second section addresses the side initiating the war and not the side really
”triggering” the conflict by over-investing in arms (and there may be great dif-
ference with respect to this issue - for example, de jure France and UK initiated
World War II declaring war against Nazi Germany); the model (by construction)
does not say anything about which side attacks fist: it would require further
modifications (like accounting for relative costs of waiting in the sense of Fearon
(1994) or benefits of the ”first strike”). Moreover, the model does not support
the idea of ”autocratic peace”.
The final note of caution is related to the fact that internal conflicts and,
hence, the desire to implement a ”small victorious war” is not necessarily limited
to non-democracies, although non-democracies seem to be more likely to fight
abroad to ensure internal political stability. Hence, a more cautios modelling of
political regimes might be required.
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